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      NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
  
 No. 94-1912 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  UNISYS CORP. RETIREE MEDICAL BENEFIT 
 "ERISA" LITIGATION 
 
 *Robert T. Dreegar; Ronald R. Bennett; Kenyon Bement; 
Donald Wagner; Lucius Browne; Donald Fabry; Thomas 
Durkin; Bernard Hart; Herman Hein; Donald L. Thompson; 
Jim M. Eaves, individually and on behalf of all members 
of the Burroughs Class and Unisys Class previously 
certified by the Court who were not participants in 
special early retirement incentive programs and their 
eligible spouses and dependents (referred to by the 
Court as "Burroughs and Unisys non-VERIP plaintiffs"), 
 
   Appellants 
 
   *(Pursuant to F.R.A.P. Rule 12(a)) 
 ___________ 
  
 Appeal from the United States District Court  
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. MDL 969)  
 District Judge: Honorable Edward N. Cahn 
 ___________ 
   
 Argued 
 May 4, 1995 
 Before:  Mansmann, Scirica and McKee, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  June 28, 1995) 
 ___________ 
 
 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
  
 This appeal, like its companion appeals in Nos. 
94-1800, 94-1801 and 94-1875, arises out of Unisys' decision to 
terminate the retiree medical benefit plans under which it had 
previously provided coverage, and to replace those plans with a 
new plan under which Unisys would eventually shift the entire 
cost of providing medical benefit coverage to the plan's 
participants, the retirees.  The appellants here, former Unisys 
or Burroughs employees (and their eligible spouses and 
dependents) who were receiving retiree medical benefits from the 
Burroughs Plans or Unisys Plan at the time of the company's 
action to terminate these plans, have appealed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment, in Unisys' favor, on the 
retirees' claims that Unisys had denied them vested benefits in 
violation of ERISA.  On appeal to us, these retirees allege that 
the district court erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the 
Burroughs and Unisys Plans were unambiguous and erred in holding 
that the retirees could not establish their claim for medical 
benefits on equitable estoppel grounds.1 
 Because the historical facts, which are not in dispute, 
have already been recited extensively, both in the district 
court's opinion granting summary judgment, see In re Unisys, 837 
F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1993), and in our own opinions in the 
appeals docketed at Nos. 94-1800 and 94-1875, we do not reiterate 
                     
1
.   The retirees have also appealed from the district 
court's May 26, 1993 order striking their demand for a jury 
trial.  We need not address this issue given our disposition of 
the ambiguity issue. 
  
these facts here.  Rather, we turn to the issues raised on appeal 
and discuss the facts insofar as they relate and pertain to our 
analysis of these issues.2 
 
 I. 
 In this case, as in all of the other consolidated 
appeals, Unisys maintained that it had an inherent right to 
terminate the retirees' medical benefit plans based on 
unambiguous reservation of rights language in the official plan 
documents.  The 1988 summary plan description for the Unisys 
Post-Retirement and Extended Disability Medical Plan, which 
applied to all class members who retired after April 1, 1989, 
contained the following provision: 
 Unisys expects to continue the plans 
described in this booklet, but necessarily 
reserves the right to change or end them at 
any time.  The Company's decision to change 
or end the plans may be due to changes in 
federal or state laws governing welfare 
benefits, the requirements of the Internal 
Revenue Code or ERISA, the provisions of a 
contract or a policy involving an insurance 
company or any other reason. 
 
(Emphasis added) (A 360).3  Similarly, the SPD for the 1985 
version of the Burroughs' retiree medical benefit plan contained 
the following reservation of rights clause:  
                     
2
.   The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the district court's grant of summary judgment.  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Bixler v. Central Penna. 
Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297-8 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
  
 While Burroughs does not presently plan to do 
so, it necessarily reserves the right to 
terminate or modify the plan at any time, 
which will result in the termination or 
modification of your coverage. 
 
(Emphasis added) (A 758).4   
(..continued) 
3
.   The retirees make a belated attempt to raise a factual 
question as to what constituted the Unisys SPD.  The retirees 
assert that the district court refused to consider evidence as to 
whether the documents in which the Unisys reservation clauses 
appeared even applied to retirees.  They argue that the court, 
"without comment accepted a clause appearing in a 1988 booklet 
describing a variety of benefit plans for active employees as 
applicable to the medical plan for retired employees which was 
not created until 1989."   
 
 The district court's decision did not acknowledge the 
existence of a factual question regarding whether this SPD 
applied to the retiree plan.  In re Unisys, 837 F. Supp. at 675-
76.  Nonetheless, we find that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as to what constituted the applicable Unisys SPD, 
as the Summary of Plan Provisions of the Unisys Post-Retirement 
and Extended Disability Medical Plan expressly incorporated the 
1988 Unisys SPD set forth above. 
4
.   On June 30, 1993, while discovery was ongoing, Unisys 
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking entry of judgment 
against all the Sperry, Burroughs and Unisys retirees other than 
those who retired pursuant to special incentive early retirement 
offerings.  In this motion, Unisys argued that summary plan 
description booklets, on their face, established that the company 
had unambiguously reserved a right to amend or terminate the 
medical plans during a participant's retirement.  The retirees 
argued that the reservation clauses did not apply to already-
retired employees and on July 8, 1993, counter-moved pursuant to 
Rule 56(f) for an order refusing or continuing Unisys' motion 
pending the completion of further discovery.  The retirees' Rule 
56(f) motion was supported by the affidavit of plaintiffs' 
counsel, attesting to the incomplete state of discovery and the 
type of evidence likely to emerge from that discovery.  (A 1142). 
 
 On October 13, 1993, the district court rendered its 
decision on Unisys' motion for summary judgment.  With respect to 
the Burroughs and Unisys regular retirees, the court held that 
there were no genuine disputes as to any material fact, and that 
the reservation of rights clauses in the documents presented by 
Unisys, on their face, were unambiguous and not susceptible to 
  
 We find that these reservation of rights clauses are 
not ambiguous and cannot be read, as the retirees suggest, to 
apply only to active employees.  Although the retirees submitted 
affidavits from class members stating that, based on past 
practice and course of conduct, they understood there to be a 
"lock-in" policy under which changes in medical benefit coverage 
could only affect active employees and not employees who had 
already retired, resort to this extrinsic evidence was not 
warranted5 because the clauses are not ambiguous, and on their 
(..continued) 
any alternate interpretation.  Because the district court found 
that it was not possible to interpret the clauses relied upon by 
Unisys in any manner other than that alleged by the company, the 
court declined to consider any extrinsic evidence to contradict 
the written terms of the summary plan description.  The court 
denied plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request to continue the summary 
judgment motion pending the completion of discovery, concluding 
that further discovery was unnecessary because "none of this 
material . . . would change the court's analysis of the threshold 
legal question."  837 F. Supp. at 673. 
 
 The Burroughs and Unisys retirees' assertion that the 
district court erred in denying their motion under Rule 56(f) is 
without merit.  Due to the fact that all of the SPDs upon which 
Unisys relied in seeking summary judgment had been produced in 
the course of discovery prior to the district court's decision on 
summary judgment and because additional discovery would not have 
precluded summary judgment, we find that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the retirees' motion pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).  See, e.g., Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 
885 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. 225 Cartons More or 
Less of an Article or Drug, 871 F.2d 409, 420 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(holding Rule 56(f) motion had been properly denied where 
discovery was immaterial as a matter of law). 
5
.   The district court held that if the retirees' 
interpretations of the reservation of rights clauses were 
plausible, the court would be obliged to consider this evidence.  
In addressing the legal question of whether the Burroughs and 
Unisys SPDs were ambiguous, the district court concluded that the 
alternative interpretations of the summary plan descriptions 
suggested by the regular retirees -- that the reservation of 
  
face do not distinguish between active employees and retirees.  
Moreover, since the Unisys and Burroughs SPDs contained a 
reservation of rights clause with no apparently conflicting 
promise of lifetime benefits, we hold that the district court did 
not err in finding that the alternative interpretation of the 
retirees was not sufficiently plausible to allow extrinsic 
evidence to alter the clear meaning of the text of the plans.6  
 ERISA requires that "[e]very employee benefit plan 
shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written 
instrument."  29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1); Hozier v. Midwest 
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163 (3d Cir. 1990).  ERISA's 
framework ensures that employee benefit plans be governed by 
(..continued) 
rights in the summary plan descriptions only applied to active 
employees or permitted only those changes required by law -- were 
unreasonable.  In re Unisys, 837 F. Supp. at 675-77. 
6
.   The regular retirees also complained that the district 
court "ruled that it would not consider other language appearing 
in the documents relied upon by Unisys because the word 
`lifetime' did not appear elsewhere in the documents, as it did 
in the SPDs applicable to the Sperry retirees."  (Appellants' 
Brief at 36).  See 837 F. Supp. at 674-75 and n.5.  This 
assertion is without merit.  The district court did not refuse to 
consider other plan language in the SPDs; it refused to analyze 
evidence of the "corporate culture" of Unisys, Burroughs and 
Sperry as reflected in evidence extrinsic to the SPDs.  Id. at 
675 n.5.  The district court, in focusing its discussion of the 
Burroughs and Unisys SPDs on the reservation of rights clauses, 
observed, that in contrast to the Sperry regular retirees, the 
Burroughs and Unisys regular retirees "failed to point to any 
other language in the SPDs that would have even arguably created 
an ambiguity."  The court, confining its analysis to the written 
documents, observed that the Burroughs and Unisys retirees could 
not avail themselves of the alternative argument advanced by 
Sperry retirees that the presence of lifetime language in the 
Sperry SPDs rendered the plans internally inconsistent, because 
the Unisys and Burroughs plan documents did not discuss lifetime 
benefits.  837 F. Supp. at 675 n.5. 
  
written documents and summary plan descriptions which are the 
statutorily established means of informing participants and 
beneficiaries of the terms of their plans and its benefits.  29 
U.S.C. §§ 1022(a) and 1102.  Because Congress intended that plan 
documents and SPDs exclusively govern an employee's obligations 
with respect to an ERISA plan, we have established a policy 
disfavoring informal plan amendments.  See Hozier, supra; Confer 
v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034, 1040 (3d 
Cir. 1994), rev'd and remand on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 115 
S. Ct. 1223 (1995).  Thus, while the retirees proffered extrinsic 
evidence of informal communications (human resource bulletins, 
newsletters and internal memoranda), this evidence cannot be 
relied upon to alter or contradict the unambiguous reservation of 
rights clauses in the Unisys and Burroughs SPDs.  Accordingly, 
the district court did not err in refusing to analyze the 
retirees' extrinsic evidence in support of their interpretation 
of the reservation of rights clauses which contradicted the 
clauses' broad and unequivocal terms. 
  
 II. 
 The district court also granted summary judgment in 
favor of Unisys on the estoppel claims of all of the regular 
retirees.  In re Unisys, 837 F. Supp at 680-81.  The Unisys and 
  
Burroughs retirees contend that the district court erred in 
holding that these estoppel claims failed as a matter of law.7  
 We have held that to recover benefits under an 
equitable estoppel theory an ERISA beneficiary must demonstrate a 
material misrepresentation, reasonable and detrimental reliance 
upon the misrepresentation and extraordinary circumstances.  
Curcio v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., 33 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 
1994); Smith v. Hartford Insurance Group, 6 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 
1993).8  Since we have concluded that the plans unambiguously 
                     
7
.   On July 26, 1994, following the district court's post-
trial decision on the contract claims of the Sperry retirees, the 
Sperry regular retirees moved for reconsideration of the district 
court's summary judgment ruling on their estoppel claim and on 
their claim for breach of fiduciary duty.  The district court 
granted this motion with respect to the Sperry retirees' claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty in light of our decision in Bixler 
v. Central Penna. Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 
(3d Cir. 1993).  The district court ruled that it would hold the 
Unisys and Burroughs retirees' motion for reconsideration of 
their breach of fiduciary claim in abeyance pending our decision 
on interlocutory appeal on the related claim of the Sperry 
retirees in No. 94-1875.   
   
8
. The district court concluded that the estoppel claims 
of the regular retirees failed as a matter of law because given 
the unambiguous SPDs, the regular retirees could not demonstrate 
plan ambiguity, reasonable detrimental reliance or extraordinary 
circumstances.  The district court found that "there are no 
substantiated allegations of fraud or bad faith on Unisys' part."  
However, in our recent decisions in Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual 
Life Insurance Co., 33 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 1994) and Smith v. 
Hartford Insurance Group, 6 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 1993), of which the 
district court did not have the benefit, we did not require fraud 
or bad faith as an element of an estoppel claim.   
 
 The district court also found, "Furthermore, estoppel 
claims are available only when plan documents are adjudged 
ambiguous."  (citing Alday v. Container Corp. of America, 906 
F.2d at 666, (11th Cir. 1990).  While in Curcio, supra, and 
Smith, supra, we did not require an express finding of plan 
  
reserved the company's right to terminate its retiree medical 
benefit plans, the retirees cannot establish "reasonable" 
detrimental reliance based on an interpretation that the summary 
plan descriptions promised vested benefits.  The retirees' 
interpretation of the plans as providing benefits which were 
vested upon retirement cannot be reconciled with the unqualified 
reservation of rights clause in the plans.  Thus, the district 
court did not err in concluding on summary judgment, as a matter 
of law, that the estoppel claims of the Unisys and Burroughs 
retirees could not be established.  
 
 III. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 
(..continued) 
ambiguity as an element for establishing an estoppel claim, we 
have required that detrimental reliance be "reasonable."  Because 
we also require that any detrimental reliance on plan language 
must be "reasonable," the court's finding that the reservation of 
rights clauses were unambiguous undercuts the reasonableness of 
any detrimental reliance by the retirees here. 
